The famous incompleteness theorem of Gödel [l] showed that a formal system containing the usual number theory must have an "undecidable" statement whose truth-value is not determined by the formal system. The present note gives an analogous theorem constructing predicates which are "flexible" in the sense that their extensions as sets are left undetermined by the formal system. We utilize the recursive-function-theoretic approach of Kleene [2] ; knowledge of his work is presupposed, and his notations and terminology will be used freely.
Consider a formal system F satisfying the following conditions: (1) F is formalized on the basis of the classical1 predicate calculus of first order with identity; (2) for every natural number n, F contains, either as a primitive or by (possibly even contextual) definition, a numeral n, which is a value of the variables (interpreted as ranging over natural numbers) ; (3) every partial recursive function is numeralwise representable in F; (4) under a Gödel numbering satisfying the usual effectiveness conditions,2 the set of theorems of F is recursively enumerable; (5) if m^n, |m = n is provable in F. These conditions are satisfied by the F of [2 ] , but we do not restrict ourselves to this system. We let Rn(x, yi, • • • , y", z) numeralwise represent Kleene's enumeration function <P"(x, yi, ■ • • , y"). Noting that (3) implies that every recursive predicate is numeralwise expressible in and April 21, 1961.
1 Lemma 1, Theorem 1, and Corollary 1.1 remain valid for intuitionistic systems. 2 We shall not endeavor to make these precise, but they should imply: (1) The wffs of F form a recursive set; (2) the Gödel number of a partial recursive function effectively determines its numeralwise representation; (3) substitution is a recursive function; (4) the Gödel number of a compound formula effectively determines its components, quantifiers, connectives, free variables, numerals, etc., and their positions.
define a set a of formulas of F to be an independent set iff for any subset ß of a, the system obtained by adding to F as new axioms the formulas of ß, plus the negations of the formulas of a -ß, is consistent. To show that a set a is independent, actually it clearly suffices to prove the stated property for every finite subset ß of a. (D) We define a predicate P(xi, is provable in F. (If more than one formula of the form (6) is provable, choose the one occurring earliest in the recursive enumeration of the theorems of F.) Let e be a Gödel number of <p. Then e will satisfy the requirements of the Lemma as long as no formula of the form (6) is provable for x = e. If some formula (6) were provable for x = e, then 4>ie) -y would be defined. Hence, since the predicate Ri(x, y, z) numeralwise represents the function $i, and since #(e) =i>i(e, e)-y, Ri(e, e, y) and 3!zRi(e, e, z) are provable in F. But 0(e) =*y implies that l(Ri(e, e, y)&3!zRi(e, e, z)) is also provable, contrary to the consistency of F. Q.E.D.
Although the crucial property of e holds only if F is consistent, from the constructive point of view it is noteworthy that e is constructed independently of the consistency hypothesis on F. In fact, e depends recursively on the Gödel number of the r.e. set of (Gödel numbers of) theorems of F. (Similar remarks apply to the existential claims made in Theorem 1 and in Corollary 1.1; these results are proved by finitary methods.) Since Lemma 1, despite its simplicity, is a powerful result, e will denote, throughout this note, the number defined in Lemma 1. 1.1. Let F be consistent. Then there exists a predicate P(x) in F such that the formulas P(n),/or non-negative integral n,form an independent set in F.4
Proof. Using Theorem 1, for m = 1, n = 0, let P(x) be the "flexible" predicate given by the theorem, i.e., Ri(e(e), x, 0). Let a be the set containing P(n) for all non-negative integral n. To show that a is independent, let ß be a finite subset of a. Then the finite set {«| P(n)<E.ß} is recursive and hence is in Si,0; let $i(f, x) be a representing function for it, for fixed /. Now let Q(x) abbreviate Ri(/, x, 0). By the proof of Theorem 1, if F is consistent, it remains consistent if we adjoin Vx(P(x)-~Q(x)).
But if P(n) is in ß, Q(n) is provable in F, and hence we get P(n) in the new system. If P(n) is in ct -ß, $i(f, w) = 1, so that Ri(/, n, 1), and hence lQ(n), is provable in F; thence lP(n) is provable in the augmented system. Q.E.D. Remark 1. If we had desired a formal definition of "flexible predicate," the property of Corollary 1.1 would be a plausible candidate for the job: A predicate P(xi, • • • , xm) is flexible in F iff the set {P(xi, • • • , xm)|xi, • • • , xm non-negative integers} is independent * Since ^.,oÇ ^«,i a special treatment of this case is not really necessary; but it will be used for Corollary 1.1 below.
in F. On this definition, even if F is consistent, the predicate "flexible for Sro,"" constructed in Theorem 1 is known to be "flexible" in the absolute sense only if ra = 0; for other values of ra, the possibility of co-inconsistency and even higher orders of inconsistency is a stumbling block. But by suitable manipulations this stumbling block can be removed. For example, if m = ra=l: Let Pi(x) be (7) (SaT^KeK x, a) & (e(e))2 = 0) V (Ri((e(e))!, x, 0) & (e(e))2 = 1).
Then if Ri(e, e, z)&3!aRi(e, e, a) is added to F, we can replace e(e) by z throughout (7). Thence if 2=2", (7) would reduce to 3aTi(y, x, a); while if z=3"-5, then (7) would reduce to Ri(y, x, 0).
Thus the proofs of both Theorem 1 (for m -n= 1) and Corollary 1.1 go through for Pi(x) thus defined.
Remark 2. The referee has pointed out that a weaker form of Corollary 1.1 holds in every essentially undecidable system; namely, each such system contains an infinite independent set of formulas. Since this fact appears not to be generally known, I outline a proof here: Let P be a formula undecidable in F, let Qi be a formula un- 
